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Abstract: 
Individual differences in working-memory (WM) capacity predicted performance on the Stroop task in 5 
experiments, indicating the importance of executive control and goal maintenance to selective attention. When 
the Stroop task encouraged goal neglect by including large numbers of congruent trials (RED presented in red), 
low WM individuals committed more errors than did high WM individuals on the rare incongruent trials (BLUE 
in red) that required maintaining access to the ―ignore-the-word‖ goal for accurate responding. In contrast, in 
tasks with no or few congruent trials, or in high-congruency tasks that followed low-congruency tasks, WM 
predicted response-time interference. WM was related to latency, not accuracy, in contexts that reinforced the 
task goal and so minimized the difficulty of actively maintaining it. The data and a literature review suggest that 
Stroop interference is jointly determined by 2 mechanisms, goal maintenance and competition resolution, and 
that the dominance of each depends on WM capacity, as well as the task set induced by current and previous 
contexts. 
 
Article: 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Baddeley, 1986, 1993) proposed a ―working memory‖ (WM) model that 
emphasized the dynamic interaction of memory maintenance and attention control in the service of complex 
cognition. In fact, individual-difference measures of WM capacity have turned out to be impressive predictors 
of a variety of cognitive abilities, including language comprehension, learning, and fluid reasoning (e.g., 
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Shute, 1991; Süß, Oberauer, Wittman, Wilhelm, & 
Schulze, 2002). The present investigation explored the idea that the attentional, ―executive‖ component of the 
WM system is specifically responsible for the covariation between measures of WM and higher order cognition 
(e.g., Conway & Kane, 2001; Engle, 2001, 2002; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999). 
 
Our view is that simple memory ability, alone, cannot account for the strong association between WM span and 
complex cognition. Supporting evidence comes from structural-equation-modeling studies that tested 
participants in ―span‖ tasks of WM and short-term memory (STM), as well as nonverbal tests of general fluid 
intelligence (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 
1999). The WM span tasks required participants to maintain information on-line while they intermittently 
processed unrelated information. For example, the Operation Span (OSPAN) task (Turner & Engle, 1989) 
interleaved short series of words to be recalled with simple equations to be solved. The STM span tasks also 
required immediate recall of word lists, but unlike the WM tasks, they did not require any additional processing 
of unrelated information. WM and STM span tasks were strongly correlated with each other at the latent-
construct level, reflecting that both involved the retention of unrelated words. However, only the WM construct 
correlated with a fluid-intelligence construct. The STM construct did not share unique variance with 
intelligence, suggesting that something other than simple retention processes must account for the relation 
between WM and complex cognitive ability. Moreover, partialing out the shared variance between the WM and 
STM constructs, which should reflect the common memorial demands of WM and STM tasks, had no effect on 
the correlation between the WM and intelligence constructs (which remained in the .60 range across studies). 
Because pure memorial processes do not account for the co-variation of WM capacity with higher order 
cognition, we have argued that WM = STM + controlled attention, and that the general, controlled-attention 
component of the WM system primarily drives the predictive utility of WM span tasks (Engle, 2001, 2002; 
Engle, Kane et al., 1999; Engle, Tuholski et al., 1999; Kane & Engle, in press). By our view, WM span tasks 
involve most of the processes required by STM span tasks, represented by the shared variance between the two 
constructs. In addition, WM tasks make greater demands on attention control than do STM tasks, because WM 
tasks present a secondary task to interfere with the primary retention task. Information maintenance in the face 
of interference is the critical function of WM capacity, and so one may examine the attention-control 
capabilities involved in interference resistance to understand the covariation between WM capacity and 
complex cognition (e.g., Conway & Engle, 1994; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Kane & Engle, 2000; Rosen & Engle, 
1998). 
 
Our use of the term attention control derives from Shallice’s (1988; Norman & Shallice, 1986) conception of a 
―supervisory attention system‖ that is engaged during conflicts among task goals, external stimuli, and well-
learned response schemas. In this vein, recent research has pointed to significant attention-control differences 
between high- and low-WM-span individuals outside of traditional memory tasks, specifically in contexts that 
present potent competition between task goals and habitual responses. For example, in an update of the 
―cocktail party‖ effect, Conway, Cowan, and Bunting (200 1) tested high and low spans, on the basis of OSPAN 
scores, in a dichotic-listening task in which the participant’s name and a yoked control name were spoken in the 
to-be-ignored channel. Previous research indicated that approximately 33% of individuals detect their name 
when it is presented in the ―unattended‖ message (Moray, 1959; Wood & Cowan, 1995). Conway et al. (2001) 
found that only 20% of high spans detected their name when it was presented, but a full 65% of low spans did 
(no participants detected the control name). These findings indicate that low spans have more difficulty resisting 
the lure of a powerful orienting cue than do high spans. 
 
Kane, Bleckley, Conway, and Engle (2001) reported similar span differences in an antisaccade paradigm, which 
presents a conflict between task goals and visual orienting cues (Hallett, 1978; Hallett & Adams, 1980). 
Participants were presented with a flashing visual cue in the periphery, and their task was to direct their eyes 
and attention away from the cue, in the opposite direction, to identify a pattern-masked letter. Thus, an 
automatic orienting response had to be prevented, or quickly recovered from, in favor of an opposing goal-
directed response. High spans made fewer eye-movement errors toward the cue, they recovered from these eye-
movement errors more rapidly, they initiated antisaccades more quickly, and they identified targets more 
quickly than did low spans. Thus, the OSPAN task predicted performance in a visual-attention task requiring 
the resolution of competition between a goal and a reflex. 
 
Dichotic-listening and antisaccade tasks are clearly ―attentional‖ tasks that have little surface similarity to either 
WM span tasks or other conventional tests of memory. Yet OSPAN, a marker of WM capacity, reliably predicts 
performance on such attention tasks in healthy, college-attending adults. Notions of WM capacity that 
emphasize number of ―chunks‖ (e.g., G. A. Miller, 1956), managing simultaneous processing and storage (e.g., 
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), or interdependence on knowledge, skill, or strategy (e.g., Ericsson & Delaney, 
1999; McNamara & Scott, 2001) cannot easily account for these lower level attention findings. Rather, these 
data appear to be converging on the importance of WM capacity for maintaining access to even a single 
representation or intention in guiding action. This access is especially important (and, perhaps, is only 
important) when significant sources of interference or response competition are present. 
 
Our view is related to Duncan’s work on ―goal neglect‖ (Dun-can, 1990, 1993, 1995; for related views, see De 
Jong, 2000, 200 1; De Jong, Berendsen, & Cools, 1999; Roberts & Pennington, 1996; West, 2001). Duncan has 
argued that in contexts lacking strong external cues for action, the production of organized behavior requires 
that hierarchically organized goal abstractions bias the selection of responses. This bias is effected through an 
attentional goal-weighting process that relies on intact prefrontal cortex (PFC) function and represents the 
essence of general fluid intelligence. Duncan and colleagues have supported this view by demonstrating that 
low-intelligence individuals, patients with PFC damage, and participants in dual-task conditions often fail to 
respond according to task goals when the environment lacks appropriate action prompts (e.g., Duncan, Burgess, 
& Emslie, 1995; Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996). Of interest, the failure to act according to 
goal is typically accompanied by an intact ability to articulate the goal when queried directly. This indicates that 
the goal was temporarily lost from active memory, that is, it was ―neglected,‖ and yet was still retrievable from 
long-term memory. 
 
Roberts and Pennington (1996) extended such ideas by arguing that, in order for an attention-control 
mechanism to bias responding towards a goal state, it must have that goal information easily accessible. If 
hierarchical goal abstractions or intentions are not actively maintained (e.g., ―look away from the cue‖ in the 
anti-saccade task), the system may be momentarily captured by salient distractors and thus produce 
disorganized and inappropriate behavior. For example, maintaining a secondary memory load in-creases 
reflexive errors in the antisaccade task by over 50% (Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994). However, by maintaining 
activation of task goals, especially in the face of salient conflicting stimuli, executive processes assure that 
global goal states will not be lost in favor of more local action cues in the environment. By this view, then, WM 
capacity is not limited to maintaining representations of external stimuli, but it also keeps action plans, goal 
representations, and task-relevant information in an easily accessible state, allowing them to appropriately bias 
responding (see also E. K. Miller, 2000). 
 
In the present study, we used the Stroop (1935) task to further examine the interaction of WM capacity, active 
goal maintenance, and the blocking or inhibition of competing stimulus representations and action plans. The 
Stroop task is a mainstay of research concerning selective attention and the external versus executive control of 
behavior (see MacLeod, 1991, for a review). In the Stroop task, participants report the colors in which words, or 
word-like stimuli, are presented. When the color and word are in conflict, such as the word RED appearing in 
blue, color naming is slower and less accurate than when the word is unrelated to the color (e.g., PIN, or XXX, 
in blue), or when the color and word match (e.g., BLUE in blue). The response slowing to conflict, or 
―incongruent,‖ stimuli is known as the Stroop effect or Stroop interference. Stroop interference may be viewed 
as analogous to the dichotic-listening and antisaccade effects described above, insofar as it represents the failure 
of a goal (―ignore the word‖) to control behavior in the face of a conflicting habitual response (reading the 
word). We reasoned that if WM capacity were important to goal maintenance in the face of competition from 
overlearned responses, then WM capacity should predict Stroop interference. 
 
Our framework is consistent with a computational model, grounded in the clinical and neuroscience literatures, 
in suggesting that a critical determinant of Stroop performance is the active maintenance of task goals in the 
face of competition from habit (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992). 
According to Cohen’s connectionist model, group differences in Stroop interference arise from the ability, or 
inability, to keep the task goal sufficiently active (i.e., ―ignore the word and respond to color‖). That is, Stroop 
performance deficits in schizophrenics are modeled by reducing the activity, or ―gain,‖ of nodes that represent 
the context, or task demands, and this is putatively analogous to decreased dopaminergic activity in prefrontal 
cortex pathways. These task-demand nodes, when normally active, bias the downstream system away from the 
dominant response by locally inhibiting the prepotent response pathway at intermediate layers of the model. 
Therefore, when these goal states are insufficiently active, they fail to block the habitual response, and greater 
interference effects are observed. Blocking is thus accomplished in part through active maintenance of 
―intention‖ (see also Braver & Cohen, 2000; O’Reilly, Braver, & Cohen, 1999). 
 
The intelligence and neuropsychological literatures actually present some difficulties for our Stroop predictions, 
however. Although there is now substantial evidence that WM capacity is related to general fluid intelligence 
and PFC functioning, there is only equivocal evidence for a relation between these constructs and Stroop 
performance. Many studies indicate significant Stroop correlations with intelligence and significant Stroop 
deficits in patients with PFC damage (e.g., Jensen, 1965; Jensen & Rohwer, 1966; Perret, 1974; Richer et al., 
1993; Spivack, Levine, & Sprigle, 1959). Other studies, however, find no such correlations or deficits (e.g., 
Ahola, Vilkki, & Servo, 1996; Jensen, 1965; Jensen & Rohwer, 1966; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Spilsbury, 
1992), although brain-imaging studies do consistently indicate PFC involvement in the Stroop effect (e.g., 
Bench et al., 1993; Pardo, Pardo, Janer, & Raichle, 1990; Zysset, Müller, Lohman, & von Cramon, 2001). By 
our reading of the relevant literatures, studies failing to link Stroop interference to intelligence or PFC generally 
minimized WM demands of the Stroop task by presenting only incongruent trials in a continuous sequence. 
Such blocked presentations of incongruent trials may minimize WM involvement because the task demands 
remain consistent across trials, making it easier for participants to keep the goal in mind. That is, once 
beginning the interference block, word information is never relevant to response, and so it must always be 
ignored on trial after trial. Every incongruent stimulus therefore reinforces the goal, to ignore the word, and so 
the task environment acts in the stead of the central executive (see also Cohen, Barch, Carter, & Servan-
Schreiber, 1999). 
 
We therefore predicted that the relation between WM capacity and Stroop interference would be most obvious 
if WM demands were increased by presenting congruent trials, in which the color and word match (e.g., the 
word RED printed in red), in addition to incongruent trials. A mixed-trial Stroop task that includes congruent 
stimuli puts more of a premium on keeping the unusual task requirements active and accessible in WM than 
does a blocked-trial task that presents only incongruent stimuli. This is because, on congruent trials, the word 
that is presented leads to the same response as the color, and so the stimulus does not reinforce the ―ignore-the-
word‖ task demands. A Stroop context including many congruent trials will allow successful responding on 
most trials even if participants completely neglect the goal and respond habitually by reading the word. Thus, 
responses on the rare incongruent trials in such a context will be especially sensitive to successful goal 
maintenance; if the goal is momentarily lost, errors will be likely. Research outside of the individual-differences 
do-main has indeed shown that the magnitude of Stroop and Stroop-like interference increases with the 
proportion of congruent trials in the design (e.g., Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979, 1998). 
 
Important—if not explicit—to this view of Stroop interference is the idea that both ―attention‖ and ―memory‖ 
play a role in determining the effect. That is, resolution of the response competition between color and word 
dimensions in the Stroop task, an attentional process, will only be engaged when the goal to do so is sufficiently 
maintained in active memory. Stroop interference is thus dually determined. It may reflect a failure to maintain 
the task goal of ignoring the word dimension, which should lead to word reading and result in errors on 
incongruent trials (or some outlying slow responses, or both; see below). Interference may also, or instead, 
reflect the time-consuming process of resolving response competition in service of a successfully activated goal 
to do so, which should lead to a relatively consistent but modest slowing on incongruent trials relative to 
baseline trials. 
 
We do not claim that this dual-mechanism account of Stroop interference is entirely new, but simply that it is 
not always explicitly recognized. As discussed above, the role of goal maintenance in resolving interference is 
implemented computationally in the Cohen model, where competition resolution—through inhibition—depends 
on activated goal representations (e.g., Cohen et al., 1990; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992).1 A dual-
component account of Stroop interference may also be implicit in the interpretation of response-time 
distributions in the task (e.g., Heathcote, Popiel, & Mewhort, 1991; Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 1996). These 
distributions show that one component of the latency in-crease on incongruent trials relative to baseline trials is 
a regular shifting of the entire incongruent-trial distribution. This shift may reflect the response competition 
elicited by every incongruent trial. Another component of the distribution, in the tail, reflects a small subset of 
very slow responses on incongruent trials, and this skewing may reflect momentary lapses of goal maintenance 
(i.e., lapses that were ―caught‖ and subsequently corrected before an overt error was produced). 
 
A dual-component view of interference is also suggested by research exploring the attentional deficits of the 
elderly and schizophrenics. Healthy older adults show equivalent interference to young adults when analyses 
isolate the response-competition component of the latency distribution (Spieler et al., 1996), and schizophrenics 
show equivalent interference to controls when it is assessed in contexts that reinforce task goals, making goal 
neglect unlikely (Perlstein, Carter, Barch, & Baird, 1998). However, in measures and contexts more sensitive to 
goal maintenance and neglect, these participant groups, along with Alzheimer’s patients (Spieler et al., 1996), 
show substantial increases either in errors or in the skew of the response-time distribution on incongruent trials. 
This pattern of results indicates that normal aging and some disease states produce particular difficulties with 
active goal maintenance in the Stroop task, and not with resolving response com-petition proper. 
 
Answers to the questions of whether WM capacity is related to Stroop interference, and whether Stroop 
interference may be de-composed into attentional and memorial components, should have broad influence on 
general theory regarding WM, fluid intelligence, PFC functioning, and the Stroop effect. Moreover, the study of 
neurological disorders, psychopathology, and clinical practice is increasingly informed by research on both WM 
capacity (e.g., Brewin & Beaton, 2002; Klein & Boals, 2001; Park, Püschel, Sauter, Rentsch, & Hell, 1999; 
Swanson & Sachse-Lee, 2001) and Stroop effects (Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 2002; Lundh, Wikstroem, 
& Westerlund, 2001; Seddon & Waller, 2000; Taylor & Russo, 2001). Advancing our understanding of the 
relation between WM and the Stroop task will therefore have substantial applied, as well as theoretical, 
implications. 
 
In five experiments we demonstrate that WM span does, in fact, predict Stroop interference and that these span 
differences vary with list-wide proportions of congruent trials, consistent with a dual-mechanism view of the 
Stroop effect. The data indicate that different manifestations of Stroop interference are dissociable by their 
relation to WM capacity. That is, the locus of WM span differences in Stroop interference is systematically 
shifted between response latencies and error rates depending on the set induced by the current, and the previous, 
―congruency‖ context. These dissociations, along with other converging behavioral and neuropsychological 
findings we will review, are consistent with the idea that Stroop interference is a multiply determined effect. 
Specifically, interference involves the time-consuming action of a relatively stable competition-resolution 
mechanism, the failure of a more transient goal-maintenance mechanism, or both, depending on the task 
context. Moreover, WM capacity is related to the successful operation of both mechanisms. Our data also imply 
that the goal-maintenance mechanism is partly responsible for producing the Stroop ―facilitation‖ effects that 
are sometimes observed on congruent trials compared with neutral trials (see MacLeod, 1998; MacLeod & 
MacDonald, 2000a, 2000b). 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 presented high- and low-WM-span participants with one of two computerized versions of the 
Stroop task differing in the proportion of congruent trials in the design, either 0% or 75%. We hypothesized that 
activation, or accessibility, of task-goal information (e.g., ―ignore the word‖) is important to successful 
performance on Stroop incongruent trials. Therefore, increasing the number of congruent trials, where the goal 
could be neglected without negative consequence, will increase the magnitude of observed interference effects. 
Increasing the number of congruent trials will make the task more sensitive to goal maintenance and neglect on 
incongruent trials, and so the task will also be more sensitive to individual differences in WM capacity. 
 
Method  
Participant Screening for WM Capacity 
Participants were first screened for WM capacity with the OSPAN task in which they solved series of simple 
mathematical operations interleaved with unrelated words to memorize (for details, see La Pointe & Engle, 
1990). A Micro Experimental Laboratory (MEL) 2.0 program (Schneider, 1988) presented the stimuli at the 
center of a color monitor. Participants were tested individually, and sat at a comfortable viewing distance from 
the monitor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants saw one operation-word string at a time, and each set of operation-word strings ranged from two to 
six items in length. For example, a set of three strings might be the following: 
 
IS (9 / 3) + 2 = 5 ? drill 
 
IS (5 X 1) - 4 = 2 ? beach 
 
IS (2 X 2) + 3 = 7 ? job 
 
The participant read the equation aloud as soon as it appeared; pausing before reading was not permitted. After 
reading the equation, the participant verbally indicated whether the provided answer was correct and then 
immediately read the word aloud. The experimenter then presented the next operation by pressing a key, and the 
participant immediately read this operation aloud. This sequence continued until three question marks (???) 
cued the participant to recall all of the words from that set only. Participants wrote the words on an answer sheet 
in the order in which they had been presented. 
 
The OSPAN score was the sum of the recalled words for only those sets completely recalled in correct order. 
Three sets of each length (from two to six operation-word pairs) were presented, allowing scores to range from 
0 to 60. The different set sizes appeared in an unpredictable order (fixed across participants), and so the number 
of words to recall was unknown until recall. 
 
Prior research has established the OSPAN task to be a reliable and valid marker of WM capacity. With respect 
to reliability, OSPAN demonstrates adequate internal reliability as indexed by Cronbach’s alpha (approximately 
.65–.75; Conway et al., 2002; Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 1992; Engle, Tuholski et al., 1999; LaPointe & Engle, 
1990). OSPAN scores also remain stable over test–retest intervals of a few minutes (r = .77–.79; Turley-Ames 
& Whitfield, 2002), to 3 weeks (stability coefficient = .82; Klein & Fiss, 1999), to 3 months (stability 
coefficient = .76; Klein & Fiss, 1999). Moreover, in studies comparing versions of OSPAN that differ in 
arithmetic difficulty, Conway and Engle (1996) and Lehto (1996) found correlations among them to be in the 
range of .70–.80. 
 
With respect to validity, the correlations among OSPAN and other WM measures, such as Reading Span 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), approach the reliability estimates of OSPAN, itself, ranging between r = .40 and 
r = .80 (Conway et al., 2002; Engle, Tuholski et al., 1999; Lehto, 1996). Moreover, both exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses reveal that OSPAN fits a tight latent variable with WM tasks using quite different 
materials. This WM latent variable is correlated with, but separate from, a latent variable constructed from STM 
tasks, and it accounts for a great deal of the variance in a latent variable constructed from measures of fluid 
nonverbal reasoning (Conway et al., 2002; Engle, Tuholski et al., 1999). Finally, specific strategies or skills 
cannot account for the covariation among OSPAN and measures of complex cognition. Partialing out 
individuals’ processing times on the equations does not reduce correlations between OSPAN and the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT), partialing out individuals’ study times on the target words does not reduce correlations 
between OSPAN and the SAT, and individually matching the OSPAN equations to each participant’s math 
ability does not reduce correlations with the SAT (Conway & Engle, 1996; Engle et al., 1992). 
 
Stroop Task 
Participants 
Eighty-seven undergraduates from Georgia State University participated in Experiment 1 as partial fulfillment 
of a course requirement. These participants were identified and invited from a pool of approximately 300–400 
people who had participated in OSPAN during the time frame of this experiment: Volunteers were 40 
participants from the top quartile of the distribution, with scores ≥ 19 (hereafter, ―high spans‖), and 47 from the 
bottom quartile, with scores ≤ 9 (hereafter, ―low spans‖).
2
 All had correctly solved at least 85% of the OSPAN 
operations, and all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision as indicated by self-report. Participation in the 
Stroop task followed O SPAN by as little as 1 day, and as many as 100 days. 
Design 
The design was a 2 X 2 X 3 mixed-model factorial, with span (high, low) and congruency proportion (0%, 75%) 
as between-subjects variables, and trial type (congruent, neutral, incongruent) as a within-subjects variable (but 
participants in the 0% congruent condition did not see congruent trials). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the two proportion-congruent conditions. 
 
Apparatus and Materials 
A MEL 2.0 program presented the stimuli in standard font on a Dell-brand computer color monitor. A MEL 
response box (Model 200) collected vocal latency and accuracy data. 
 
The stimulus list for each version of the Stroop task consisted of 288 total trials. Each trial presented a letter 
string representing one of three trial types. Congruent trials presented the capitalized word, RED, BLUE, or 
GREEN, in its matching hue (e.g., RED in red). Incongruent trials presented one of these color words in a 
mismatching hue (e.g., BLUE in red). Neutral trials presented the letter string, JKM, XTQZ, or FPSTW, in red, 
blue, or green. Neutral stimuli were chosen to match color words in length, but to share no letters with the color 
words, given that even a few shared letters between Stroop stimuli and color names may produce some small 
level of interference (see MacLeod, 1991). 
 
Each participant saw 36 critical trials in each of the three trial types (except for participants in the 0% congruent 
condition, who saw zero congruent trials), and response times and accuracy were analyzed for only these critical 
trials. For critical congruent trials, each color word appeared 12 times in its matching color. For critical 
incongruent trials, each color word appeared 6 times in each of the two conflicting colors. For neutral trials, all 
of which were critical, each letter string appeared 4 times in each of the three possible colors. The remaining 
filler trials—which were not identifiably ―filler‖ to the participant—presented congruent or incongruent stimuli 
to create the appropriate list-wide proportions of congruent trials. In the 0% congruent condition, all 216 filler 
trials were incongruent, and in the 75% congruent condition, all 180 filler trials were congruent. All letter 
strings and target colors were equally represented across filler and critical trials. Critical trials were coded as 
such in the computer program that presented stimuli and collected responses, but they were otherwise identical 
to the filler trials. For each participant, the computer program randomly determined the presentation order of all 
288 critical and filler trials. 
 
Procedure 
All participants were individually tested. During the Stroop task, the overhead lights were turned off, and a 50-
watt lamp was turned on and placed on the floor. The experimenter remained in the room for the entire session. 
The basic requirement of the Stroop task was to name aloud the color in which a letter string was presented 
onscreen, as quickly and accurately as possible. The task began with two practice blocks. The first block of 12 
trials was designed to familiarize participants with the microphone. Participants simply read aloud each color 
word (RED, BLUE, or GREEN) that was displayed in white. The second block of 36 trials was designed to 
familiarize participants with color naming and with the neutral letter strings. Here, participants named the color 
of each neutral stimulus (JKM, XTQZ, or FPSTW) that was presented in red, blue, or green. Each letter string 
and color appeared equally often in Blocks 1 and 2. The final block of 288 trials consisted of the critical and 
filler trials described above. 
 
We hoped to motivate participants to consistently ignore word information during the task, especially those in 
the 75% congruent condition who might find it easier to purposely read the word on most trials. The 
experimenter therefore explicitly instructed all participants to ignore the word on every trial, even if the word 
and color matched on some (or many) trials. The experimenter further explained that we were only interested in 
their performance on incongruent trials, and not congruent trials, and that they would perform much better on 
the important, incongruent trials if they always tried to ignore the word in favor of the color. As well, the 
experimenter instructed all participants that they would be observed to determine that they never looked away 
from the word or squinted their eyes during the task. Finally, all participants were encouraged to respond 
quickly while being accurate. 
 
A voice-activated relay recorded response latencies to each letter string, and these latencies reflected time from 
stimulus onset to response onset. The experimenter recorded accuracy by keying in the word spoken by the 
participant (―red,‖ ―blue,‖ ―green‖), with each word represented by a button on the response box. A fourth 
button was used to indicate an error of speech, such as stuttering when naming the color (e.g., ―b-blue‖) or 
slurring two names together (e.g., ―gre-blue‖). 
 
Each trial began with the presentation of a yellow READY? signal at the center of the screen against a black 
background. The ready signal remained on screen until the participant pressed the keyboard’s space bar, and 
was followed by a 1,000-ms blank screen. A centered, white fixation signal (******) then appeared for 200 ms, 
followed immediately by the target letter string that remained in the center of the screen until response (or 30 s, 
whichever came first). The experimenter then logged the response through key-press, and then after a 500-ms 
delay, the next ready signal appeared. 
 
Results  
Participants 
The mean OSPAN scores for the high- and low-span participants, respectively, were 23.25 (SD = 6.36, range = 
19–54) and 6.53 (SD = 2.05, range = 2–9). 
 
Stroop Task 
For all analyses reported hereafter, the alpha level is set at .05; we present p values for effects and interactions 
that do not reach this criterion. 
 
Response Times 
For all response-time analyses reported hereafter, group means were taken across individual participants’ 
trimmed-mean latencies for correct responses in each condition. In trimming, any naming trial that exceeded the 
participant’s mean response time for that condition by more than three standard deviations was deleted, as was 
any trial with a latency less than 200 ms. In all experiments reported, fewer than 2% of trials were trimmed for 
both high- and low-span participants. Mean response times in Experiment 1 by span group, congruency 
proportion, and trial type are presented in Table 1. 
 
Interference effects. Interference effects and facilitation effects are not independent, because they are both 
calculated against the same baseline (interference contrasts incongruent with neutral trials, and facilitation 
contrasts congruent with neutral trials). However, as is normative in Stroop research, we analyze these effects 
separately, most importantly because the 0% and 75% congruent conditions can only be compared directly on 
neutral and incongruent trials (the 0% condition presented no congruent trials). By inspection of the means for 
Experiment 1, incongruent trials yielded substantially slower responses than did neutral trials, and this 
interference effect was larger for the 75% congruent condition than for the 0% condition. Low spans showed 
only somewhat larger interference effects than did high spans. 
 
A 2 (span group) X 2 (congruency proportion) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
with trial type as a repeated measures variable, tested these observations. Responses on incongruent trials were 
slower than on neutral trials, indicating a significant Stroop interference effect, F(1, 83) = 240.64, MSE = 
2,669.56, and this Stroop effect was significantly larger for participants in the 75% congruent condition than for 
those in the 0% condition (i.e., congruency proportion interacted with trial type), F(1, 83) = 48.23, MSE = 
2,669.56. However, there were no significant effects involving span: High- and low-span participants showed 
similar naming latencies overall, F(1, 83) = 1.16, MSE = 24,695.07, p = .28, and this was true for both the 0% 
and 75% congruent conditions (with F < 1 for the interaction of span and congruency proportion). Most 
important for present purposes, low spans did not show larger interference effects than did high spans, either 
overall, F(1, 83) = 2.22, MSE = 2,669.56, p = .14, or in consideration of congruency proportion: The three-way 
interaction of span, congruency proportion, and trial type indicated that the span groups showed equivalent 
interference across congruency conditions (F < 1). 
 
Facilitation effects. Of secondary interest, we examined congruent versus neutral response times in the 75% 
congruent condition. Increasing the list-wide proportion of congruent trials should have made goal neglect (and 
so, overt word reading) more likely in low spans. We thus expected low spans to show more benefit from a 
color–word match on congruent trials than would high spans. 
 
By inspection of the response-time means in Table 1, congruent trials yielded faster responses than did neutral 
trials, reflecting response-time ―facilitation.‖ Moreover, low spans appeared to show larger facilitation effects 
than did high spans in the 75% congruent condition. A 2 (span) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model ANOVA 
confirmed these impressions: Congruent-trial latencies were significantly shorter than neutral-trial latencies, 
F(1, 42) = 64.61, MSE = 889.97, and this facilitation was greater for low spans than for high spans, F(1, 42) = 
3.63, MSE = 889.97, p = .06 (facilitation was significant for both high- and low-span groups individually, both 
Fs > 35). As indicated by facilitation, then, low spans appeared less likely than high spans to ignore word 
information during the 75% congruent task. Low spans thus benefited more when this information was 
congruent with the goal. 
 
Errors 
Participants’ mean proportion of color-naming errors, by WM span, congruency proportion, and trial type, are 
displayed in Table 1. Anecdotally, we can report that virtually every error reflected reading the word, either in 
part (as in ―gre-blue‖ for the intended response ―blue‖) or outright. 
 
 
Interference effects. Inspection of the means suggests that, unlike response times, error rates were highly 
sensitive to span differences in interference, but this was true for the 75% congruent condition only. (As with 
response times, interference was measured by subtracting neutral error rates from incongruent error rates.) A 2 
(span) X 2 (congruency proportion) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on error rates for 
neutral and incongruent trials. As with response times, a significant Stroop effect emerged, with more errors 
committed on incongruent than on neutral trials, F(1, 83) = 74.20, MSE = 0.003. Moreover, this interference 
effect was larger in the 75% congruent condition than in the 0% condition (i.e., congruency proportion 
interacted with trial type), F(1, 83) = 34.14, MSE = 0.003. 
 
In contrast to the latency data, high and low spans performed differently. Low spans committed more errors 
overall than did high spans, F(1, 83) = 5.73, MSE = 0.004, and, critically, low spans showed a larger Stroop 
interference effect than did high spans, F(1, 83) = 7.56, MSE = 0.003. Finally, span interacted with trial type 
and congruency proportion, F(1, 83) = 3.94, MSE = 0.003, p = .05, indicating that the span difference in 
interference was larger in the 75% congruent condition than in the 0% condition. 
 
To assess whether span differences in interference were significant in each congruency condition, we examined 
them separately. In the 0% congruent condition, the Stroop effect was significant overall, F(1, 41) = 14.19, MSE 
= 0.001, but high and low spans did not differ in interference, F(1, 41) = 1.08, MSE = 0.001,p = .3 1. In 
contrast, the 75% congruent condition produced an overall Stroop interference effect, F(1, 42) = 61.63, MSE = 
0.005, as well as a significant difference in interference between high and low spans, F(1, 42) = 6.55, MSE = 
0.005 (interference in the 75% condition was significant for both the high- and low-span groups individually, 
both Fs > 17). A full 40% of low-span participants committed more than 20% errors on incongruent trials, 
whereas only 11% of high spans did; error rates over 30% were demonstrated by 28% of low spans and no high 
spans. Clearly, in a high-congruency context, which allowed for goal neglect without frequent cost, low spans 
made more errors than did high spans on those rare trials where the goal (―ignore the word‖) and habit (―read 
the word‖) came in direct conflict. 
 
Facilitation effects. As with response times, we examined facilitation effects in errors by comparing the 
proportion of errors committed on congruent versus neutral trials for participants in the 75% congruent 
condition. Error rates in these two conditions were near floor, and a 2 (span) X 2 (proportion congruent) X 2 
(trial type) ANOVA on neutral and congruent trials indicated no significant facilitation effect and no span 
difference in facilitation (both Fs < 1). 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, participants differing in WM capacity, as measured by the OSPAN task, were tested in one of 
two versions of the Stroop task that differed in the list-wide proportion of congruent trials (i.e., on which the 
color and word matched). We hypothesized that WM capacity should predict vulnerability to 
Stroop interference, but especially as the proportion of congruent trials in the context increased. In 0% 
congruent tasks, active goal maintenance should be least demanding because the task context repeatedly 
reinforces the goal, to ignore the word: Nearly every trial in the 0% condition presents an incongruent stimulus 
in which the word must be ignored for accurate responding. In a 75% congruent task, however, the context does 
not often reinforce the goal. Most trials present congruent stimuli, for which the habitual response of word 
reading is not detrimental. 
 
Indeed, span differences in interference were robust in only the 75% congruent condition, suggesting span 
differences in goal neglect. But contrary to prototypical Stroop findings, these span differences arose in 
accuracy, and not in response time.3 Although low spans demonstrated numerically larger response-time 
interference effects than did high spans in both congruency conditions, suggestive of span differences in 
resolving response competition, these span differences were not statistically significant. Thus, in the 0% 
congruent context, no WM-related differences were seen in either response time or error interference. The 75% 
congruent task, in contrast, appears to have promoted goal neglect, particularly for low-WM-span individuals. 
Low-span participants demonstrated significantly larger response-time facilitation effects, as well as larger error 
interference effects, and we would interpret both these effects as arising from periodic, overt word reading. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
We presented accuracy feedback in Experiment 2 in part to make closer contact with the Stroop literature. In 
healthy, adult participants, Stroop interference is more typically seen in latencies than in errors, and so here we 
tried to force any WM-related interference differences out of errors and into response times by emphasizing 
accuracy. Here we presented all high- and low-WM-span participants with two versions of the Stroop task, 
differing in the list-wide proportion of congruent trials. In the first task, 75% of the trials were congruent, and in 
the subsequent task, 0% of the trials were congruent. Thus, in contrast to Experiment 1, congruency was 
manipulated within subjects and between blocks. The 75% congruent task was identical to that used in 
Experiment 1, except that accuracy feedback was presented after every trial. This feedback was also presented 
during the 0% congruent task, which further differed from Experiment 1 in presenting half the number of trials 
to accommodate both tasks within a single session. 
 
To preview, the data from the 75% task in Experiment 2 closely replicated those from Experiment 1, with span 
differences in interference arising in error rates, and not in response times, despite the presentation of accuracy 
feedback throughout. Also as in Experiment 1, span groups differed significantly in response-time facilitation. 
 
Method 
The OSPAN and Stroop task methods for Experiment 2 were identical to those of Experiment 1 with the 
following exceptions. 
 
Participants 
We tested 88 undergraduates (40 high spans, 48 low spans, using the same participation criteria as in 
Experiment 1) from Georgia State University and Georgia Institute of Technology, in return for partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement or for extra credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision by self-
report. Participants were drawn from a larger pool that had completed the OSPAN task approximately 30 min 
before beginning the Stroop task. The larger pool and these specific participants were different from those 
tested in Experiment 1. 
 
Design 
The design was a 2 X 2 X 3 mixed-model factorial, with span (high, low) as a between-subjects variable, and 
congruency proportion (75%, 0%) and trial type (congruent, neutral, incongruent) as within-subjects variables. 
 
Apparatus and Materials 
The stimulus list for the 75% congruent task in Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experiment 1. The 0% list 
was cut from 288 to 144 total trials, but the critical trials were identical to those from Experiment 1. Here, only 
72 filler trials were presented in the 0% congruent task, all of which were incongruent. Each word and color 
was equally represented across filler and critical trials. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment began with the same two blocks of practice trials used in Experiment 1. Following practice, all 
participants completed the 75% congruent task and then the 0% congruent task. Before beginning each of the 
tasks, participants were encouraged to consistently ignore the words, even though many trials might present 
matching color–word combinations, because we were only interested in performance on incongruent trials. 
Participants were also encouraged to respond as quickly as possible while remaining accurate. 
 
Experiment 2 helped participants monitor accuracy by providing visual and auditory feedback after every trial. 
The message ―Correct Response‖ or ―Incorrect Response‖ was presented for 500 ms after the experimenter 
keyed in each response. Errors were additionally signaled by a tone, coincident with the visual feedback. 
 
Results  
Participants 
The mean OSPAN scores for the high and low spans, respectively, were 22.88 (SD = 3.78, range = 19–35), and 
6.06 (SD = 2.46, range = 0–9). 
 
Stroop Task 
Response Times 
Mean response times in Experiment 2 by span group, proportion-congruent condition, and trial type are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Interference effects. Inspection of the means suggested that, in contrast to the 0% and 75% congruent 
conditions from Experiment 1, low spans had longer latencies overall than did high spans. However, the span 
differences in interference in both the 0% and 75% conditions appeared to be comparable with those in 
Experiment 1, where they were nonsignificant. A 2 (span group) X 2 (congruency proportion) X 2 (trial type) 
mixed-model ANOVA indicated that, although high spans had shorter naming latencies than did low spans 
overall, F(1, 86) = 11.40, MSE = 45,504.65, span did not interact significantly with either congruency (F < 1) or 
trial type, F(1, 86) = 2.88, MSE = 3,713.32, p = .09, and the three-way interaction of span, congruency, and trial 
type was also nonsignificant, F(1, 86) < 1, all indicating comparable response-time interference effects for high- 
and low-span participants across congruency conditions. There was, however, a significant Stroop effect 
overall, F(1, 86) = 444.41, MSE = 4,023.06, which was larger for the 75% congruent condition than for the 0% 
condition, F(1, 86) = 102.03, MSE = 1,585.50. 
 
Facilitation effects. Inspection of the means in Table 2 suggests that response-time facilitation was greater for 
low spans than for high spans in the 75% congruent condition. A 2 (span) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model 
ANOVA confirmed that latencies for congruent trials were significantly shorter than those for neutral trials, 
F(1, 86) = 138.64, MSE = 1,008.31, and that low spans showed significantly larger facilitation effects than did 
high spans, F(1, 86) = 10.10, MSE = 1,008.31 (again, the facilitation effect was significant for each span group, 
with Fs > 40). As in Experiment 1, the 75% congruent condition was quite sensitive to span differences in 
response-time facilitation, but not in interference. 
 
 
Errors 
Participants’ mean color-naming error rates in Experiment 2, by WM span, congruency proportion, and trial 
type, are displayed in Table 2. 
 
Interference effects. Inspection of the means in Table 2 suggests that low spans showed a larger error 
interference effect than did high spans in the 75% congruent condition only, as they had in Experiment 1. A 2 
(span) X 2 (congruency proportion) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model ANOVA indicated that low spans had a 
higher error rate overall than did high spans, F(1, 86) = 6.17, MSE = 0.004, that span interacted with 
congruency proportion, F(1, 86) = 7.87, MSE = 0.002, and that span interacted with trial type, indicating span 
differences in error interference, F(1, 86) = 4.87, MSE = 0.003. The three-way interaction of span, congruency 
proportion, and trial type approached conventional significance, F(1, 86) = 2.88, MSE = 0.002, p = .09. 
 
To explore this predicted interaction, we tested for span differences in the 0% and 75% congruent conditions 
separately. In the 0% congruent condition, the span groups showed equivalent error rates overall (F < 1), and 
despite a significant Stroop effect, F(1, 86) = 12.95, MSE = 0.001, high and low spans showed equivalent 
interference, F(1, 86) = 1.05, MSE = 0.00 1, p = .3 1. In contrast, the 75% congruent condition elicited a higher 
overall error rate for low spans than for high spans, F(1, 86) = 8.34, MSE 0.005, a significant interference effect 
overall, F(1, 86) 109.12, MSE = 0.004, and most importantly, a larger interference effect for low spans than for 
high spans, F(1, 86) = 5.09, MSE = 0.004 (the error interference effect was significant for each span group, with 
Fs > 26). The significant span difference in interference clearly replicates that from Experiment 1. 
 
Facilitation effects. For the 75% congruent condition, error proportions on congruent and incongruent trials 
were near floor and did not significantly differ from each other, F(1, 86) = 1.81, MSE = 0.002; span groups did 
not differ in error facilitation (or lack thereof) either (F < 1). 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 presented high- and low-span participants with the 75% congruent condition used in Experiment 
1, but with accuracy feedback. Despite this salient feedback provided after every trial, low spans still committed 
more errors on incongruent trials than did high spans in the 75% congruent task. Low spans also showed larger 
response-time facilitation effects than did high spans. Both findings replicated Experiment 1. The reduction in 
the span difference in errors in Experiment 2 versus Experiment 1 suggests that the presentation of accuracy 
feedback helped low spans reduce their goal neglect somewhat, but obviously it did not eliminate it entirely. In 
Experiment 1, 40% of low spans made ≥ 20% errors, whereas in Experiment 2, only 21% of low spans 
committed this many errors. It should be noted that high spans’ error rates in the 75% congruent condition 
remained remarkably constant between Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting that they were better able than low 
spans to monitor their performance without the presentation of overt feedback. In Experiments 1 and 2, 11% 
and 13% of high spans, respectively, made ≥ 20% errors. 
 
Subsequent to the 75% congruent task, participants encountered a 0% congruent Stroop task that was shortened 
relative to that in Experiment 1. Presenting the 0% task after the 75% task did not appreciably change the 
results. In both Experiments 1 and 2, there was a nonsignificant tendency for low spans to show greater 
response-time interference than did high spans in the 0% congruent condition. However, that tendency did not 
approach significance in Experiment 1 (p = .18) and fell short of conventional significance levels in Experiment 
2 (p = .09). 
 
EXPERIMENTS 3A AND 3B 
Although we predicted larger WM span differences in interference in the 75% congruent condition than in the 
0% congruent condition, we expected span differences in the 0% condition to be more robust than they were. 
Presumably some degree of goal maintenance is necessary in even the 0% congruent Stroop task, but even if 
goal maintenance is almost entirely unnecessary in our 0% task, prior research on memory interference suggests 
that WM capacity is related to the effective resolution of response competition in service of the task goal (e.g., 
Conway & Engle, 1994). In fact, low spans’ response-time interference effects in the 0% congruent task were 
over 50% larger than high spans’ in Experiment 1, and over 25% larger in Experiment 2, despite the lack of 
statistically significant differences between groups. Perhaps span differences would have been more substantial 
in the 0% congruent task after less task practice, before the goal of ignoring word information had been 
practiced. In Experiment 1, all three proportion-congruent conditions presented the same number of total trials, 
so the 0% congruent task presented far more incongruent trials to each participant than did the 75% congruent 
task (252 vs. 36). In Experiment 2, the 0% congruent task was presented after 288 trials of the 75% task. It is 
therefore conceivable that span differences might be larger when the 0% congruent task is more novel. 
Moreover, the large span difference in errors in the 75% congruent condition may have reflected a lack of 
practice with incongruent stimuli as much as it reflected a failure of goal maintenance. Perhaps with more 
incongruent-trial practice, high and low spans would become equivalently able to withhold habitual responses 
in favor of goal-directed ones. 
 
Experiments 3A and 3B presented high- and low-WM-span participants with the 0% congruent task before the 
75% congruent task. Here we tested whether practice with incongruent trials—and not the probability of goal 
neglect—was responsible for the different pattern of WM span effects between the 0% and 75% tasks in 
Experiments 1 and 2. If lack of practice with incongruent trials is critical to producing span differences in 
interference, then reducing the number of incongruent trials encountered prior to the 0% congruent task should 
make it more sensitive to WM differences. Likewise, presenting the 75% congruent task after substantial 
practice on the 0% task should make the 75% task less sensitive to WM differences. 
 
The two experiments differed only in their trial pacing (participant- vs. computer-paced in Experiments 3A and 
3B, respectively), and because this variable did not appreciably affect the results, their data were combined for 
all analyses. To preview, although practice did affect the pattern of span differences in interference, it did so in 
an unexpected way. 
 
Method 
The OSPAN and Stroop task methods for Experiments 3A and 3B were identical to those of Experiment 2 with 
the following exceptions. 
 
Participants 
We tested 75 undergraduates (40 high spans, 35 low spans) in Experiment 3A and 63 undergraduates (28 high 
spans, 35 low spans) in Experiment 3B, all from Georgia State University and Georgia Institute of Technology, 
in return for partial fulfillment of a course requirement or for extra credit. Participants were drawn from a larger 
pool that had completed the OSPAN task approximately 30 min before beginning the Stroop task. These 
participants were different from those tested in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Design 
The designs for both Experiment 3A and 3B were 2 X 2 X 2 mixed-model factorials, with span (high, low) as a 
between-subjects variable, and congruency proportion (0%, 75%) and trial type (congruent, neutral, in-
congruent) as within-subjects variables. 
 
Procedure 
In both experiments, all participants completed the 0% congruent task and then the 75% congruent task. In 
Experiment 3A, trials were participant-paced, as they were in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 3B, trials 
were computer-paced: The participant initiated each trial block by pressing a key at the presentation of a yellow 
READY? signal. After a 600-ms blank screen, a white fixation signal (******) appeared for200 ms, followed 
immediately by the target letter string that remained until response (or 30 s, whichever came first). The 
experimenter then keyed in the response as in Experiment 1, and then after a 600-ms delay, the next fixation 
signal automatically appeared. 
 
Results  
Participants 
The mean OSPAN scores for the high and low spans, respectively, were 22.98 (SD = 3.72, range = 19-34), and 
5.66 (SD 1.57, range = 2-8) in Experiment 3A, and 25.61 (SD 5.43, range = 20-38), and 6.23 (SD = 2.64, range 
= 0-9) in Experiment 3B. 
 
Stroop Task 
Response Times 
Mean response times in combined Experiments 3A and 3B, by span group, congruency proportion, and trial 
type, are presented in Table 3. 
 
Interference effects. From inspection of the means, low spans appeared to show larger interference effects than 
did high spans in both the 0% and 75% proportion-congruency conditions. Because a 2 (span group) X 2 
(experiment) X 2 (congruency proportion) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model ANOVA indicated that the only effect 
of experiment was a marginally significant interaction with congruency proportion, F(1, 134) = 3.25, MSE = 
3,473.08, p = .07 (with most other Fs < 1), we did not analyze this variable further. 
 
High-span participants responded more quickly than did low spans overall, F(1, 134) = 6.58, MSE = 36,660.95, 
and unlike the previous experiments, span group interacted with trial type, indicating significant span 
differences in response-time interference, F(1, 134) = 12.74, MSE = 3,414.53 (interference was significant for 
each span group, with Fs > 3 10). As the means suggest, the nonsignificant interaction of span, trial type, and 
congruency (F < 1) demonstrated that span differences in interference were significant and comparable in both 
congruency conditions. Thus, in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, low spans in Experiments 3A and 3B 
demonstrated greater interference in latencies than did high spans. 
 
 
The only remaining significant results were a main effect of trial type, indicating a significant Stroop effect 
overall, F(1, 134) = 601.61, MSE = 3,414.53, and a Congruency Proportion X Trial Type interaction, F(1, 134) 
= 73.95, MSE = 1,009.21, indicating greater interference in the 75% than the 0% congruent condition. 
 
Facilitation effects. From inspection of the means in Table 3, high and low spans demonstrated equivalent 
facilitation effects in the 75% congruent condition, in contrast to the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, and 
despite the greater power here. A 2 (span) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model ANOVA revealed that congruent trials 
yielded faster responses than did neutral trials overall, F(1, 136) = 167.55, MSE = 717.95, but the lack of a Span 
X Trial Type interaction indicated that WM span did not affect response-time facilitation (F < 1). 
 
Errors 
Participants’ mean color-naming error rates in Experiments 3A and 3B combined, by WM span, congruency 
proportion, and trial type, are displayed in Table 3. 
 
Interference effects. Inspection of the means suggests that, unlike response times, error rates were not sensitive 
to span differences in interference in either the 0% or 75% congruent conditions. We conducted a 2 (span) X 2 
(experiment) X 2 (congruency proportion) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model ANOVA on error rates, and found 
significant effects only for trial type, F(1, 134) = 152.13, MSE = 0.003, indicating a Stroop interference effect, 
and for the interaction of congruency proportion and trial type, F(1, 134) = 121.25, MSE = 0.001, indicating 
greater interference for the 75% congruent condition than for the 0% condition (all other Fs < 1.05). Unlike the 
previous experiments, then, no span differences were seen in error interference in any congruency condition, 
despite other effects being statistically detectable. 
 
Facilitation effects. As in Experiments 1 and 2, a 2 (span) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model ANOVA indicated that 
errors in the 75% congruent condition were equivalent, and near floor, on congruent and neutral trials, and the 
span groups were equivalent in facilitation (or lack thereof; with all Fs < 1). 
 
Discussion 
Presenting the 0% congruent task before the 75% congruent task produced span differences in response-time 
interference in both tasks, and it did so in both Experiments 3A and 3B. Thus, congruency-task order appears to 
have a robust effect on the pattern of span differences in Stroop interference. Low spans showed greater error 
interference than did high spans in the 75% congruent conditions when they were presented as a first task 
(Experiments 1 and 2), but low spans showed exaggerated response-time interference in the 75% condition 
presented after a 0% condition here. The lack of a span difference in error interference for a 75% congruent task 
that followed a 0% task (despite significant interference overall) suggests that practice in a 0% congruent 
context reduced the subsequent probability or severity of goal neglect in low-span participants. 
 
In addition, here the response-time interference differences between high and low spans in the 0% congruent 
tasks were significant, where they had not been in Experiments 1 and 2. As we expected, this may have resulted 
from the more limited practice with incongruent trials in Experiments 3A and 3B compared with Experiments 1 
and 2. In Experiment 1, the 0% congruent task consisted of twice as many trials as in Experiments 3A and 3B, 
and in Experiment 2, the 0% task was presented after 288 trials of practice with the 75% congruent task. 
However, because the combined Experiments 3A and 3B had included more participants than did either 
Experiment 1 or 2, the significant span differences seen here may reflect improved power rather than the effects 
of practice. To test this idea we conducted a 2 (span) X 2 (trial type) X 2 (experiment) ANOVA on the 0% 
congruent response-time data from Experiments 1 and 2 together. The key finding from this analysis was that, 
with the improvement in power, low spans’ interference effects in the 0% condition were significantly larger 
than high spans’ effects, F(1, 127) = 4.90, MSE = 1,881.43, and this span difference in interference did not 
interact with experiment (F < 1). Thus, it appears that whether the 0% congruent task was completed as a first 
task or as a second task, low spans showed larger response-time interference than did high spans across 
experiments; however, the effect is not especially robust, and so large samples are required to detect it. 
 
With respect to the 75% congruent task, span differences in interference were evident in Experiments 3A and 
3B, but in response times rather than in errors. Practice on a 0% condition did not eliminate span differences in 
interference on a subsequent 75% condition, but it did shift the effect from errors to response times. To ensure 
that the lack of a response-time difference between high and low spans in the 75% congruent conditions from 
Experiments 1 and 2 had not been due to insufficient power, we conducted a 2 (span) X 2 (trial type) X 2 
(experiment) ANOVA on the combined 75% congruent data from both experiments. Unlike the analysis of the 
0% congruent data reported above, here the increase in power did not reveal significant span differences. Low 
spans’ 75% task interference effects in latency were not larger than high spans’, F(1, 128) = 1.78, MSE = 
3,632.56, p = .18, and this lack of a span difference in interference did not interact with experiment (F < 1). 
Thus, when the 75% congruent task was encountered first, WM span predicted error interference only, and 
when the 75% task was encountered after the 0% congruent task, WM span predicted latency interference only. 
 
Thus, Experiments 1–3B indicated that the locus of WM-span-related differences in Stroop interference 
depends not only on the congruency proportions within the task, but also on the order in which congruency 
proportions are encountered. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that 75% congruent tasks that occur as a first 
task produce span differences in error interference, whereas Experiments 3A and 3B both showed that these 
same tasks occurring subsequent to 0% congruent tasks produce span differences in response-time interference. 
Although 0% congruent tasks produced small and inconsistent span effects in response-time interference within 
individual experiments, combined-experiment analyses reported above indicated that low spans showed greater 
response-time interference in these tasks, regardless of task order. For a summary of results across Experiments 
1–3B, see Figures 1 (response-time interference) and 2 (error-rate interference). 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
We conducted Experiment 4 to extend the generality of the findings summarized above. Our primary interest 
was in whether the differences we observed between the 0% and 75% congruent tasks, and their order effects, 
were tied to these specific congruency proportions. In particular, we tested whether there was some-thing 
unique about a 0% congruent Stroop task, that is, whether the inclusion of any congruent trials would affect 
interference and span differences therein, or whether any low-congruency proportion would lead to results 
similar to those we had found. One could imagine that, with some minimal proportion of congruent trials in the 
design (e.g., 10% or 20%), some low-span participants might periodically fail to maintain the task goal. If this 
were true, the 0% congruent condition, which presents no congruent trials, would be a special case. 
 
 
 
 
We therefore tested high- and low-span participants in high- and low-congruency Stroop tasks, but here the 
percentages of congruent trials were 80% and 20%, respectively. We also manipulated congruency order within 
this single experiment, with half of the participants encountering the 20% congruent task first, to make contact 
with the full picture of results we obtained in Experiments 1–3B (see Figures 1 and 2). Our predictions for the 
80% congruent condition were straightforward—like the 75% condition, we expected span differences in error 
interference when it was encountered first, and in response-time interference when it followed the 20% task. For 
the 20% congruent task, we predicted findings to follow those of the 0% congruent task, with span differences 
in response-time interference regardless of task order. 
 
However, we also thought it possible that the inclusion of congruent trials in the 20% congruent task might lead 
to some discrepancies with the 0% data. For example, the 20% task might lead at least some low-span 
participants to intermittently neglect the goal, leading to span differences in error interference like those we 
observed in the 75% congruent task. Or, more subtly, the 20% task might fail to establish the task set as 
effectively as did the 0% task. Even in the absence of detectable error effects within the 20% congruent task, the 
subsequent 80% task might be more susceptible to goal-maintenance failures than it would be after following 
the 0% task. Thus, span differences in errors, rather than in response time, might arise in the subsequent 80% 
congruent task. 
To measure responses to a suitable number of trials per condition while still keeping the length of the 
experiment manageable for participants, we eliminated the neutral trials here. Thus, in Experiment 4, we 
calculated all interference effects as the difference between congruent and incongruent trials, rather than 
between neutral and incongruent trials. 
 
Method 
The OSPAN and Stroop task methods for Experiment 4 were identical to those of the previous experiments with 
the following exceptions. 
 
Participants 
We tested 274 participants (136 high spans, 138 low spans) in Experiment 4. These participants were either 
undergraduates from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro or Georgia Institute of Technology, 
completing the experiment in return for partial fulfillment of a course requirement or for extra credit, or young-
adult volunteers from the Atlanta, Georgia, metro area, completing the experiment for pay. Participants were 
drawn from a larger pool that had completed the OSPAN task between 1 and 240 days before beginning the 
Stroop task. None of these participants had been tested in Experiments 1–3B. 
 
Design 
The design for Experiment 4 was a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 mixed-model factorial, with span (high, low) and 
congruency-proportion order (20%- first, 80%-first) as between-subjects variables, and congruency proportion 
(20%, 80%) and trial type (congruent, incongruent) as within-subjects variables. 
 
Apparatus and Materials 
The stimulus list for the 20% congruent task consisted of 180 total trials, with 36 critical congruent trials, 36 
critical incongruent trials, and 108 filler incongruent trials. The list for the 80% congruent task consisted of 180 
total trials, with 36 critical congruent trials, 36 critical incongruent trials, and 108 filler congruent trials. Each 
word and color was equally represented across filler and critical trials, which were identical to one another 
except for their coding in the computer program that presented the stimuli and recorded responses. 
 
Procedure 
All participants in Experiment 4 completed a practice color-naming block identical to those in Experiments 1–3, 
followed by the 20% and 80% congruent blocks. Participants were randomly assigned to a congruency-task 
order, completing the 20% congruent condition before the 80% condition or vice versa. Trials were participant-
paced, as they were in Experiments 1, 2, and 3A, but no accuracy feedback was provided, as in Experiment 1. 
On each trial, a ready signal remained on screen until the participant pressed the keyboard’s space bar, followed 
by a 750-ms blank screen. A centered, gray fixation signal (i.e., a plus sign) then appeared for 250 ms, followed 
immediately by the target word that remained in the center of the screen until response. The experimenter then 
logged the response through key-press, and then after a 250-ms delay, the next ready signal appeared. 
 
Results  
Participants 
The mean OSPAN scores for the high and low spans, respectively, were 24.28 (SD = 5.09, range = 18–38) and 
5.25 (SD = 1.99, range 0–9) in the 20%-first condition, and 23.80 (SD = 5.38, range 18–42) and 5.37 (SD = 
1.75, range = 0–9) in the 80%-first condition. 
 
Stroop Task 
Response Times 
Mean response times in Experiment 4, by span group, congruency-proportion order, congruency proportion, and 
trial type, are presented in Table 4. From inspection of the means, the 80% congruent tasks produced larger 
interference effects than did the 20% congruent tasks overall. However, low spans appeared to show greater 
interference than high spans in all conditions, that is, in both congruency proportions and in both proportion 
orders. 
A 2 (span group) X 2 (congruency-proportion order) X 2 (congruency proportion) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model 
ANOVA confirmed these observations. Consistent with our findings from 0% and 75% tasks, Stroop 
interference effects were larger in the 80% congruent conditions than in the 20% congruent conditions, F(1, 
270) = 670.28, MSE = 1,419.43. In addition, the significant span difference in latency, F(1, 270) = 4.01, MSE = 
38,533.42, was moderated by significant interactions of span with congruency proportion, F(1, 270) = 6.3 1, 
MSE = 4,642.86, and with trial type, F(1, 270) = 13.49, MSE = 3,517. 11, the latter indicating greater 
interference for low spans than for high spans overall (interference was significant for both span groups, with Fs 
> 722). However, the nonsignificant interactions of span, congruency proportion, and trial type, F(1, 270) = 
2.23, MSE = 3,161.8 1, p = .14, of span, congruency-proportion order, and trial type, F(1, 270) = 1.42, MSE = 
3,517.11, p = .23, and of span, congruency-proportion order, congruency proportion, and trial type (F < 1) 
indicated that span differences in interference did not differ as a function of congruency proportion, or the order 
in which congruency proportions were encountered. Thus, span differences in latency interference were seen 
here in both 20% and 80% congruent conditions, for both 20%-first and 80%-first participants. (For archival 
purposes, the full ANOVA results for response times are presented in Appendix A.) 
 
Errors 
Participants’ mean proportion of color-naming errors in Experiment 4, by WM span, congruency order, 
congruency proportion, and trial type, are displayed in Table 4. From inspection of the means, 80% congruent 
conditions produced greater interference effects than did 20% conditions, and low spans showed larger 
interference effects than did high spans in only these 80% congruent conditions. However, the span difference 
in 80% congruent errors appeared to be present in both task orders (i.e., for both 20%-first and 80%-first 
participants). 
 
 
These impressions were confirmed by a 2 (span) X 2 (proportion-congruency order) X 2 (proportion 
congruency) X 2 (trial type) mixed-model ANOVA on error rates. Stroop interference was significant overall, 
F(1, 270) = 224.87, MSE = 0.004, and it was larger for the 80% congruent condition than for the 20% condition, 
F(1, 270) = 132.15, MSE = 0.002. Low spans com-mitted more errors than did high spans, F(1, 270) = 11.87, 
MSE = 0.007, but this span effect was modified by a significant interaction of span and trial type, F(1, 270) = 
16.32, MSE = 0.004, and a significant interaction of span, trial type, and congruency proportion, F(1, 270) = 
16.76, MSE = 0.002. Thus, as expected, span differences in error interference were larger in the 80% congruent 
condition than in the 20% congruent condition (span differences in interference in the 80% condition were 
significant for both high- and low-span groups, with Fs > 99): A follow-up analysis indicated that, although the 
Stroop effect was significant in the 20% congruent condition, F(1, 270) = 57.52, MSE = 0.002, it did not differ 
in magnitude between high- and low-span participants, F(1, 270) = 1.63, MSE = 0.002, p = .20. 
 
In contrast to our prior findings, but obvious from inspection of the means, span differences in the high-
congruency condition did not depend on the presentation order of congruency conditions here. Span did not 
interact significantly with congruency-proportion order and trial type, F(1, 270) = 1.47, MSE = 0.002, p = .23, 
or with congruency-proportion order, congruency-proportion, and trial type (F < 1). Thus, low spans’ 
exaggerated vulnerability to error interference in 80% congruent conditions was present whether the 80% task 
was completed first or following the 20% task. (For archival purposes, the full ANOVA results for error rates 
are presented in Appendix B.) 
 
As a final analysis of errors, we examined their latencies. It should be noted that if a majority of errors in the 
80% congruent condition were the result of goal neglect, then they should have had short latencies; that is, goal 
neglect should lead to overt word reading and therefore faster responses than accurate color naming.  
Experiment 4 was the first of our experiments to have a large enough sample for such an analysis. First, we 
identified participants who committed at least six errors (a 16.7% error rate) in the incongruent condition from 
the 80% congruent task, regardless of task order, to obtain minimally stable mean latencies for each participant. 
We then divided the errors into two types: ―clean‖ errors represented trials on which the participant clearly said 
a color–word aloud that did not match the color of the stimulus, and ―ambiguous‖ errors represented trials on 
which the participant stuttered, slurred words together, said a noncolor word, or made any other kind of 
incorrect or ambiguous response. 
 
Our principal concern was with clean errors, as these should most clearly represent word-reading responses 
reflecting goal neglect. We hypothesized that, not only would more low spans reach the error criterion than high 
spans (as suggested by the error analyses above), but of these errors a higher proportion would be clean for low 
spans than for high spans; that is, among error-prone individuals, low spans should make disproportionately 
more word-reading errors than other kinds of errors. With respect to latencies, we predicted that clean errors 
should be considerably faster than ambiguous errors and correct responses on incongruent trials. In contrast, 
clean-error latencies should be similar to congruent-trial latencies, where word reading and color naming may 
both con-tribute to mean response time (see MacLeod, 1998). Finally, we predicted that span groups should not 
differ significantly in clean-error latency. Once a person neglects the goal and reads the word, there is no reason 
to think that WM span should predict the speed of word reading. 
 
Our hypotheses were confirmed. Of importance, only 22 high spans met our inclusion criterion of ~~!! 6 
incongruent errors in the 80% congruent condition, whereas 47 low spans did, which is obviously more than 
twice the number of high spans. Moreover, even among this highly error-prone group, low spans had a larger 
error interference effect than did high spans (Ms = +.23 and +. 17, respectively), F(1, 67) = 4.40, MSE = 0.01. 
These numbers provide further dramatic indication of the robustness of span difference in error interference. 
With respect to the kinds of errors committed by error-prone participants, clean errors made up a mean of 58% 
of high spans' errors and 68% of low spans' errors. Although this span difference was in the predicted direction, 
with low spans making proportionally more clean errors, it did not reach conventional significance, F(1, 67) = 
2.00, MSE = 0.07, p = .16. 
 
Error-prone participants' response times on incongruent errors and on correct congruent and incongruent trials 
in the 80% congruent condition are presented in Table 5. A 2 (span group) X 2 (error type) mixed-model 
ANOVA indicated that, as expected, clean errors were committed much more quickly than ambiguous errors, 
F(1, 57) = 58.46, MSE = 792,484.57. Moreover, high- and low-span participants had equivalent error latencies, 
and span group did not interact with error type (both Fs < 1). Thus, participants who committed goal-neglect 
errors did so quickly, regardless of WM capacity. We also compared response times on clean errors with those 
on accurate congruent and incongruent trials, expecting them to be similar to congruent trials and substantially 
shorter than incongruent trials. A 2 (span group) X 3 (response type) ANOVA indicated no response-time 
differences between span groups, nor an interaction of span and response type (both Fs < 1), but a significant 
overall difference among response types, F(2, 134) = 144.17, MSE = 6,352.46. As expected, clean-error 
latencies were not different from congruent latencies, F(1, 67) = 2.3 1, MSE = 6,688.63, p = .13, but much 
shorter than those on accurate incongruent trials, F(1, 67) = 131.04, MSE = 9,318.3 1. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 4, which used 20% and 80% congruent conditions, demonstrated both similarities and differences to 
Experiments 1–3B, which had used 0% and 75% congruent conditions. In our prior experiments, low-congruent 
conditions yielded small but significant span differences in response-time interference, regard-less of whether 
they were presented before or after high-congruent conditions (i.e., in the collapsed data from Experiments 1 
and 2, and from Experiments 3A and 3B). In contrast, high-congruent conditions produced span differences in 
error interference when completed as a first task (Experiments 1 and 2), while producing span differences in 
latency interference when completed after a low-congruent task (Experiments 3A and 3B). 
 
Here, the data from the low-congruent condition, itself, closely matched our prior findings, despite the fact that 
we changed the congruency proportion rather dramatically, from 0% to 20%. Like the 0% task across our 
experiments, the 20% congruent task yielded significant span differences in response-time interference, 
regardless of task order. Unexpectedly, it was the 80% congruent condition, modified only from a 75% 
condition, which produced anomalous results. In short, the 80% congruent task produced span differences in all 
manifestations of interference, rather than selectively eliciting it in errors in high-congruency-first conditions 
and in latencies in high-congruency-last conditions. That is, low spans produced greater interference than did 
high spans in both latencies and error rates, for both the 20%-first and 80%-first groups. How might these 
discrepant results be explained? 
 
First, with respect to the significant span differences in response-time interference, regardless of congruency 
order, the discrepancy is more apparent than real. Although Experiments 1 and 2 failed to find a significant span 
difference in response-time interference in a 75% congruent task encountered as a first task (instead, finding 
differences in error rates), interference was calculated there against a neutral-stimulus baseline (see Figure 1). In 
Experiment 4, however, it was calculated against a congruent-trial baseline because we eliminated the neutral 
trials there. When we compared the response-time interference effect in Experiment 4 with recalculated effects 
from Experiments 1–3B, now using the congruent-trial baseline (see Figure 3), the pattern across experiments 
was consistent: Low spans showed greater response-time interference than did high spans against a congruent 
baseline. The response-time data from Experiment 4 thus provide no real inconsistency with Experiments 1 and 
2. 
 
However, these data do pose the question of whether neutral or congruent trials are the proper baseline from 
which to assess Stroop interference (see Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; MacLeod, 1991). We believe our neutral 
baseline and the conclusions we draw from it in Experiments 1–3B are defensible because the pattern of span 
differences in response-time interference and facilitation across experiments cannot be attributed to differences 
in the neutral-baseline latencies. That is, in Experiments 1 and 2, where span groups differed in facilitation but 
not interference, span differences in neutral response times occurred only in Experiment 2. In Experiments 3A 
and 3B, where span groups differed only in interference and not in facilitation, span differences in neutral 
response times occurred only in Experiment 3A. Thus, span differences in response-time interference and 
facilitation, as measured against a neutral-stimulus baseline, varied systematically with congruency-condition 
order, but not with neutral-baseline differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Returning to Experiment 4, the real discrepancy it produced with Experiments 1–3B is the significant span 
difference in error interference in the 80% congruent conditions, regardless of task order. Of course, we did 
expect span differences in errors when the 80% condition was encountered first, replicating the robust findings 
from Experiments 1 and 2, which presented a 75% congruent condition first. However, in Experiment 4, the 
80% task that followed the 20% task also produced findings indicative of overt word reading (i.e., failed goal 
maintenance and subsequent errors) in low-span participants. In contrast, in Experiments 3A and 3B, a 75% 
congruent task that followed a 0% task elicited span differences only in response-time interference, not in 
errors, indicating less difficulty in goal maintenance for the low spans there. 
 
 
We believe that this difference between experiments is meaningful, because there was no hint of a span 
difference in error interference in either Experiments 3A or 3B, and the effect here in Experiment 4 was 
substantial. As foreshadowed in the introduction to this experiment, our provisional explanation for the effect is 
that the preceding 20% congruent task did not as firmly establish the ―ignore the word‖ task set as did the 0% 
task used in the other experiments. The presence of congruent trials did not lead to actual, or overt, error/goal-
neglect differences between high- and low-span participants in the 20% congruent condition, itself. However, it 
may have subtly interfered with low spans’ ability to overlearn the task set over the course of 180 trials. 
Whereas a 0% congruent task may help low-span participants transfer the ―ignore the word‖ goal to a 
subsequent high-congruency task, a 20% task may not. Such an explanation is sensible but speculative, and so 
further work will be required to confirm it. 
 
Finally, Experiment 4 allowed us to examine incongruent-trial errors from high-congruency conditions more 
closely than in prior experiments, because of the relatively large N allowed by the similarity of the 20%-first 
and 80%-first results. We found that for a subsample of participants with high error rates in the 80% congruent 
condition, low spans were over twice as likely to reach our ―error prone‖ criterion than were high spans, and 
furthermore, error-prone low spans showed greater error interference than did error-prone high spans. For both 
span groups, most errors were ―clean,‖ that is, they represented a clear color-naming response that did not 
match the target color, and so most likely reflected word reading (low spans’ errors were slightly more skewed 
toward clean errors than were high spans’). Also regardless of WM capacity, clean errors were committed very 
quickly, further sup-porting the proposal that they reflected overt word reading that resulted from failed goal 
maintenance. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In five experiments we investigated the relation between WM capacity, as measured by the OSPAN task, and 
Stroop interference. Experiments 1, 2, and 4 demonstrated in a straightforward manner that WM span is related 
to goal maintenance and neglect in the Stroop task. Low spans committed many more errors on 
incongruent trials than did high spans when congruent trials made up 75% or 80% of the Stroop trials (and 
Experiment 4 indicated that most of these errors were committed very quickly). Without the external goal 
reinforcement provided by frequent incongruent trials, low spans were more likely to lose access to the goal and 
respond according to habit, by reading the word in error. In contrast, in the 0% and 20% congruent tasks from 
all of our experiments, low spans showed somewhat larger response-time interference effects than did high 
spans, despite changes in the statistical significance of span difference across individual experiments. Here, low 
spans did not show evidence of overt word reading, suggesting that the presentation of mostly incongruent trials 
helped participants to keep track of the task goal of ignoring the word information. Moreover, in the 75% 
congruent task in Experiments 3A and 3B, where it followed the 0% task, span differences in interference 
appeared in latencies, and not in errors. Thus, in 0% congruent task contexts that provided substantial goal 
reinforcement by requiring color naming on every trial, and in 75% congruent contexts that followed these 0% 
tasks, low spans did not often lose complete track of the task goal. Instead, they were slower to respond 
accurately, according to goal, than were high spans. 
 
Our results clearly demonstrate that span differences in error versus latency interference were strongly 
influenced by the current and previous task contexts. In particular, when the prior 0% congruent context 
reinforced the goal of the task by repeatedly presenting incongruent trials, it appeared to establish a task set that 
transferred to the subsequent 75% congruent task. Even though the subsequent 75% task did not externally 
reinforce the task goal, it yielded span differences in response-time interference, rather than in errors, just as in 
the 0% tasks. Viewing these transfer effects another way, high spans' error interference effects in the 75% 
congruent task were strikingly stable (and low) across experiments, regardless of task order. In contrast, low 
spans' effects varied systematically by whether the 75% task followed the 0% task. Low spans showed large 
error effects when the 75% congruent condition was encountered first, and small error effects when it was 
presented after the 0% congruent condition. At least with respect to accuracy, then, low spans were more 
affected by set transfer than were high spans, responding in the 75% task as they had in the previous 0% task. 
This pattern is reminiscent of our own antisaccade findings that low spans had more difficulty than high spans 
switching set from one blocked task to another (Kane et al., 200 1).
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In contrast to the 75% congruent task, the 0% and 20% tasks were not particularly sensitive to task set, 
producing latency interference of about the same modest magnitude across experiments, regardless of task 
order. This differential sensitivity of low- and high-congruency tasks to set transfer was first reported by Lowe 
and Mitterer (1982, Experiment 3). They tested two groups of participants who differed in the progression of 
congruency conditions encountered across six sessions, with one group exposed to the progression 0%, 50%, 
75%, 75%, 50%, 0% and the other exposed to the progression 75%, 50%, 0%, 0%, 50%, 75%. For the group 
starting with the 0% congruent task, response-time interference was stable across sessions, with effects ranging 
from 20 ms to 32 ms. As in our experiments, then, the 0% task established a strong set that affected subsequent 
tasks, effectively reducing subsequent effects of congruency over sessions. For the group starting with the 75% 
congruent task, in contrast, interference varied widely over sessions. Effects ranged from 15 ms to 47 ms, and 
the magnitude of interference was closely tied to the proportion of congruent trials in the current session. 
Moreover, the interference effects seen in the 75% tasks differed substantially between the task-order groups (M 
= 20 ms for the 0%-first group and M = 47 ms for the 75%-first group). Similar to our findings, then, the 75% 
congruent task yielded smaller effects following the 0% task than preceding it. 
 
Our broad conclusions about set-transfer effects must be tempered, however, by our findings from Experiment 
4, which involved a 20% congruent task rather than a 0% task. Here, when the 80% task followed the 20% task, 
it produced span differences in error interference effects, just as in the 80% and 75% congruent tasks that 
appeared as first tasks. As we suggested in our discussion of Experiment 4, this finding suggests that the 
presence of even a relatively small proportion of congruent trials may have subtle effects on the establishment 
and transfer of the task set. Whereas the 0% congruent tasks in Experiments 3A and 3B appear to have 
established a set that transferred to the subsequent 75% task, making goal neglect less likely there, the 20% task 
does not seem to have done so. Given that the effects of the 0%-to-75% sequence were replicated across 
experiments 3A and 3B, we are confident that they are real, and so further work will be required to establish 
whether the 20% congruent effects are similarly reliable and important. 
 
Dual Mechanisms of Stroop Interference? 
WM capacity and task context interact to moderate the strength and the locus of Stroop interference. Moreover, 
we suggest that the specific patterns of span effects observed here suggest that Stroop interference has two 
causes, as we described in the introduction. One mechanism is a rather consistently time-consuming process of 
competition resolution, which is reflected primarily in latencies and prevailing in contexts that minimize the 
need for goal maintenance. The other, additional mechanism is a more transient failure of goal maintenance, 
reflected most obviously in accuracy and prevailing in contexts that maximize the need for goal maintenance. 
By our view, the former competition resolution mechanism can only be properly engaged when the goal to do 
so is actively maintained, or is reinforced by the task context (see also Cohen et al., 1990). Although our data 
suggest that both mechanisms rely on WM capacity, the congruency context determines the relative influence of 
the goal-maintenance mechanism. 
 
Specifically, we propose that low spans have a relatively enduring deficit in the competition-resolution 
mechanism, independent of goal maintenance. This deficit was largely responsible for the modest span 
differences in response-time interference in 0% congruent tasks, 20% tasks, and in 75% tasks that followed 0% 
tasks. Low spans were not more likely to commit word-naming errors in these conditions than were high spans, 
suggesting that they were not as often neglecting the goal of the task altogether. However, low spans could not 
resolve the conflict between word and color responses as quickly as could high spans. In contrast, the WM 
differences in error interference in 75% and 80% congruent tasks that were not preceded by 0% tasks resulted 
largely from momentary failures of goal maintenance in low spans. Here, low spans were more likely than high 
spans to name the words, in error, suggesting that low spans periodically lost the goal from active memory to 
ignore the word.
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Further evidence for the dual nature of interference is also suggested by our facilitation data. Only Experiments 
1 and 2, where the 75% congruent conditions did not follow 0% conditions, produced span differences in both 
error interference and response-time facilitation. That is, only in contexts where low spans were induced to 
neglect the task goal and overtly read the words on incongruent trials were low spans also more likely to 
respond faster than high spans on congruent trials. To the extent that response-time facilitation reflects 
participants actually reading the word aloud on some proportion of congruent trials (MacLeod & MacDonald, 
2000b; for a detailed discussion, see below), this finding suggests that both error interference and latency 
facilitation arise from the failure of the goal-neglect mechanism of Stroop interference. 
Although our findings concerning span, context, and task set may not conclusively point to dual Stroop 
mechanisms, below we review converging data in the literature for this idea. We already discussed some of the 
relevant findings in our introduction, such as the fact that schizophrenics show low-span-like patterns of Stroop 
deficits that are linked to congruency contexts. That is, schizophrenics show exaggerated error interference and 
response-time facilitation effects in high-congruency contexts, indicative of goal neglect, and less exaggerated 
response-time interference in low-congruency contexts (e.g., Cohen et al., 1999; Perlstein et al., 1998).  
 
Analyses of Stroop latency distributions from normal adults are also suggestive. When the distributions of 
incongruent and neutral response times are compared, incongruent trials produce an overall shift in the normal 
part of the distribution, as well as an increase in positive skew resulting from a small proportion of very slow 
responses (e.g., Heathcote et al., 1991; Stroop, 1935). We argue that the overall shift reflects the regular process 
of resolving response competition on all incongruent trials. In contrast, the increased skew reflects some 
exaggerated response times resulting from periodic goal neglect. That is, this subset of very slow responses in 
the tail of the distribution represents trials on which the goal was lost but then recovered before an overt error 
was committed, thus leading to much slower responses than on trials on which the goal is maintained and 
implemented immediately. 
 
If our arguments are correct, then variables thought to affect goal neglect should have a selective effect on 
skew, and not on the overall distribution shift. Indeed, skew on incongruent trials is selectively increased for 
participant populations prone to lapses of intention, such as in older adults (Spieler et al., 1996), and it is 
increased in young adults when trials are presented at a very slow pace, thus encouraging mind-wandering and 
goal neglect (De Jong et al., 1999). In contrast, skew is selectively decreased when trials are rapidly paced to 
limit lapses (De Jong et al., 1999), and also when color and word dimensions of Stroop stimuli are spatially 
separated (Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 2000), a manipulation that should reduce the likelihood that participants 
would read the words overtly and lose track of the color-naming goal. 
 
Additionally, evidence from cognitive neuroscience techniques suggests separable competition and goal-neglect 
mechanisms of Stroop interference. For example, research by West and colleagues has demonstrated that 
different event-related potentials from frontal cortex correspond to different manifestations of Stroop 
interference. Specifically, West and Alain (1999, 2000a) found that an increased negativity, probably generated 
by anterior cingulate cortex, begins between 400 ms and 500 ms after the onset of an incongruent stimulus (the 
―N450‖; see also Liotti, Woldorff, Perez, & Mayberg, 2000). Given the timing of this wave, and the putative 
role of anterior cingulate in response selection and competition (e.g., Posner & Peterson, 1990; Posner & 
Raichle, 1994), we interpret the N450 as involved in the competition-resolution mechanism of Stroop 
interference. In contrast, West and Alain (2000b) discovered that a slow wave, originating in polar or 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dPFC), and beginning 400–800 ms before a Stroop stimulus is presented, 
discriminated errors from correct responses on the upcoming stimulus. Moreover, this error-predicting wave 
was significantly larger in mostly congruent Stroop tasks than in mostly incongruent Stroop tasks. Given the 
association of this wave with errors, its sensitivity to congruency, and its likely source in a brain region that 
supports goal maintenance (e.g., Braver & Cohen, 2000; Duncan, 1995), we suggest that it is a marker of the 
goal-neglect mechanism of Stroop interference (see also West, 2001). 
 
These conclusions are further bolstered by recent event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging data 
from a Stroop task in which the instructions to read the word or name the color were presented 11 s before each 
stimulus appeared (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Half the trials were word-reading trials and 
half were color-naming trials, with 50% congruent trials in each task. Over the 11-s delay, dPFC activity 
increased on color-naming trials only; no increase was seen on the more automatic, word-reading trials. 
Moreover, the correlation between delay-period dPFC activity and Stroop interference in color naming was 
strongly negative (r = -.63). These data indicate that dPFC acts to reduce Stroop interference by maintaining the 
―name the color/ ignore the word‖ demands in an active state. Despite the fact that many imaging studies 
indicate anterior cingulate activation in Stroop tasks (for a review, see MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000b), here 
there was no anterior cingulate activity related to task instructions over the cue-to-target delay. Instead, anterior 
cingulate activity was closely linked to the onset of incongruent stimuli, and it was positively correlated with 
interference (r = .38), with greater activity associated with larger interference effects. These findings indicate 
that anterior cingulate may not have a role in combating Stroop interference, but rather it may signal or 
recognize that conflict is present. 
 
The findings discussed above, regarding response-time distributions and correlations between brain activity and 
interference, indicate that evidence for failed goal maintenance may sometimes be obtained even in the absence 
of frequent overt errors. Goal neglect may be indicated by positive skew in incongruent latency distributions in 
some task contexts, or by dPFC activity before the onset of Stroop stimuli. This is useful knowledge at a 
pragmatic level. Researchers working with participant groups who may not show the substantial error effects 
demonstrated by low WM individuals, schizophrenics, or Alzheimer’s patients may still be able to evaluate 
hypotheses about goal maintenance and neglect by examining more subtle behavior or neural effects in Stroop 
latencies.
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In addition, the findings are important at a theoretical level, because they suggest that failures in goal 
maintenance may not be all-or-none. That is, participants may periodically lose complete access to the goal and 
read the word instead of naming the color, but in addition, they seem able to incrementally boost the activation 
of the task goal (as in the imaging studies), and also to suffer intermediate levels of goal neglect—monitoring 
for and catching errors before overt responses are made, and producing a small number of very slow but correct 
responses (as in the latency-distribution studies). Perhaps goals are not maintained in an all-or-none fashion, but 
rather are activated in a more graded fashion, below which overt errors are most likely to occur but above which 
some probability of retrieving the goal before error commission is retained. This idea seems consistent with the 
graded activation levels possible for the ―task demand‖ goal units in the Cohen model (e.g., Cohen & Servan-
Schreiber, 1992) and also with the cumulative gamma function used to model the attentional-control mechanism 
in the Stroop counter model (Jacoby, McElree, & Trainham, 1999; Trainham, Lindsay, & Jacoby, 1997); it is 
also analogous to the variety of ―capture‖ errors and action slips regularly seen in the lab and in life, which are 
sometimes corrected before being completed (see Reason, 1990). The implications of this view for our data are 
that WM capacity and task context may mediate both the probability and the degree of active goal maintenance 
in the Stroop task. Some goal neglect probably occurs in all contexts and for all participants, but low WM 
capacity and high-congruency contexts elicit more episodes of goal neglect, less consistently high activation of 
goal states, or both, than do high WM capacity and low-congruency contexts. 
 
Mechanisms of Stroop Facilitation 
MacLeod (1998; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000a, 2000b) has argued that Stroop interference and facilitation 
are independent phenomena, despite the fact that virtually every theory and model of the Stroop effect assumes 
that they are but two sides of the same coin. That is, interference is assumed to reflect competition between 
color and word dimensions on incongruent trials, whereas facilitation is assumed to reflect a convergence of the 
two dimensions on congruent trials. MacLeod, however, pointed out several empirical dissociations between 
facilitation and interference effects in the literature, and in new data, that challenge this idea (but see Jacoby et 
al., 1999; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994). Instead, MacLeod argued that responding on congruent trials reflects a 
mixture of slower, color-naming responses and faster, word-naming responses. Because ―incorrect‖ word 
naming and ―correct‖ color naming cannot be discriminated on congruent trials, the presence of fast word-
naming responses in the distribution de-creases the average latency. To restate this view in our terms, 
facilitation arises through goal neglect, as participants periodically read the distractor word aloud. 
 
We believe that our data support MacLeod’s (1998; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000a, 2000b) ―inadvertent 
reading‖ hypothesis. As already discussed, WM span predicted response-time facilitation only in Experiments 1 
and 2, and not in Experiments 3A and 3B (see Figure 4). In Experiments 1 and 2, the 75% congruent task was 
performed first, and low spans showed evidence of increased goal neglect by committing errors on incongruent 
trials. That is, low spans only showed greater response-time facilitation than high spans when they were also 
more likely to neglect the goal and read words overtly. Moreover, low spans’ facilitation effects were largest in 
Experiments 1 and 2, where their error rates on incongruent trials were also highest. High spans’ facilitation 
effects, in contrast, remained constant across experiments, as did their incongruent error rates. 
 
Correlational analyses of our data, independent of WM span, also support a connection between goal neglect 
and facilitation. If losing access to goal information—and subsequent word reading—leads to response-time 
facilitation, then response-time facilitation and error interference should be significantly correlated. Indeed, this 
is the pattern that emerges from our 75% congruent task data, which are presented in Table 6. Response-time 
facilitation correlated positively with error interference in Experiments 1, 2, 3A and 3B, with rs between .34 
and .45. As in other reports (e.g., Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Vanayan, 1992, cited in MacLeod, 1998), we found 
no positive correlation between response-time facilitation and response-time interference (with rs between –. 15 
and .25). Although this may be taken to support our idea that error-and latency-interference effects are 
dissociable, it is more likely to reflect the statistical artifact of calculating facilitation and interference effects 
from the same neutral baseline (Watson, Brown, & Stott, 2001). In any case, the main point here is that the two 
key indices of goal neglect in our experiments, error interference and latency facilitation, were positively 
correlated with one another. Moreover, whereas error interference correlated with latency facilitation, error and 
latency interference did not significantly correlate with each other (rs = –.02, .17, and .10 in Experiments 1–3B, 
respectively), further suggesting that the two indices of interference may reflect different mechanisms. 
 
We would therefore amend MacLeod’s (1998; MacLeod & MacDonald, 2000a, 2000b) conclusion that Stroop 
facilitation is independent of Stroop interference. Facilitation may be independent of the competition-resolution 
process that largely contributes to interference in 0% congruent tasks and in other conditions that minimize the 
need for goal maintenance. However, facilitation is, in fact, at least partly dependent on the goal-neglect 
mechanism that largely contributes to interference in 75% congruent Stroop tasks (and in other conditions that 
put a premium on effective goal maintenance). Although our data cannot rule out a possible role of convergent 
color and word responses in producing Stroop facilitation (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1999), our data clearly do support 
a role for goal neglect in determining the effect. 
 
 
An Attentional View of WM Capacity 
We have recently argued that the mechanism responsible for the broad predictive power of WM span tasks is a 
domain-general, executive-attention mechanism that allows for the maintenance of stimulus representations, 
action plans, and goals in the face of interference (Engle, 2001, 2002; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Engle, 
Tuholski et al., 1999; Kane & Engle, in press). Our view is that, although the active maintenance of information 
may be useful in many contexts, it is most critical under conditions of interference. In the absence of 
interference, task-relevant information or goals can be retrieved on demand from inactive long-term memory. In 
the presence of interference, however, task-irrelevant in-formation and action schemas are likely to be retrieved, 
resulting in errors or slowed responding (e.g., Norman, 1981; Reason, 1990). Thus, interference sets the 
occasion for reliance on active memory maintenance. Moreover, individual differences in such active, 
controlled maintenance determine the capability to prevent attentional focus from being captured by mental or 
environmental distractors—to avoid powerful distractors, one must actively maintain the intention to do so (see 
also Roberts & Pennington, 1996). By this view, then, active maintenance and distractor blocking are 
interdependent executive-attention processes that are central to WM capacity. 
 
Our findings, here, clearly support this theoretical view. As in dichotic listening (Conway et al., 2001) and 
antisaccade tasks (Kane et al., 200 1), low-WM-span individuals demonstrated worse performance than high 
spans in Stroop tasks that present conflict between habit and goal. Despite the surface differences among these 
three attention-control tasks, they all had in common the requirement that powerful stimuli for action had to be 
ignored for goal-appropriate responding: Prepotent, elicited responses had to be held in check. In all of these 
tasks, low spans perform significantly worse than do high spans, and in particular, low spans are deficient in 
their ability to prevent attentional ―capture‖ and respond in a goal-directed manner (see Conway & Kane, 2001). 
 
Our discovery that the proportion of congruent trials in the Stroop task drives WM span differences in error 
interference supports our idea that goal maintenance, and individual differences therein, are critical to action 
control and selective attention. At least, this is true under conditions where the prompts for action are 
compelling but in conflict with momentary intention. When the Stroop context promoted goal neglect by failing 
to reinforce task goals, low spans committed more errors than did high spans. In contrast to theoretical 
arguments that inhibitory capabilities con-strain WM capacity (e.g., Dempster, 1991, 1992; Hasher & Zacks, 
1988), then, our error interference findings suggest that WM capabilities constrain attentional inhibition, or at 
least the consistency of its application (see also De Jong, 2000, 2001; Engle, 1996; Roberts et al., 1994; Roberts 
& Pennington, 1996). 
 
However, in the present experiments we also found WM-span differences in Stroop contexts that did not 
encourage goal neglect, such as in 0% and 20% congruent conditions, where low spans showed greater 
response-time interference than did high spans (see also Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 
2000). Here, goal maintenance was presumed to be less critical than in the 75% and 80% congruent contexts, 
because the repeated presentation of incongruent trials should have reinforced the ignore-the-word goal of the 
task often enough to aid goal-directed responding. Our finding of span differences in interference here, along 
with dissociations between response competition and goal neglect in the Stroop literature, indicates that WM 
capacity may be linked to additional attentional capabilities that are not obviously involved in active goal 
maintenance in the face of interference. Indeed, recent demonstrations that WM span correlates with negative 
priming (Conway, Tuholski, Shisler, & Engle, 1999), with counting from 1 to 12 visual objects (Tuholski, 
Engle, & Baylis, 2001), and with flexibly allocating the extent of visual attention (Bleckley, 2001), suggest that 
the relation between WM capacity and attentional functioning will require further specification. 
 
Moreover, in a study published after we completed Experi-ment 4, Long and Prat (2002) found that WM span is 
differentially related to Stroop interference according to incongruency-proportion contexts. As in our studies, 
they found in two experiments that when incongruent trials made up the majority of trials in the task, low-span 
participants showed larger response-time interference effects than did high spans. However, they also found in 
one experiment that when incongruent trials were relatively rare in the task, high and low spans demonstrated 
equivalent interference in latencies and errors; this conflicts with our findings of span differences in error 
interference when incongruent trials were rare. Of importance, in the Long and Prat study, low proportions of 
incongruent trials accompanied high proportions of neutral trials (XXXXX) rather than congruent trials. A 
context that is high in neutral trials should not induce goal neglect because word reading is not a possible 
response on these trials, so this is almost certainly the source of the discrepancy between our findings. More 
work will need to be done to determine why a context that is very high in neutral trials would prevent high 
spans from more effectively resolving the response competition present on incongruent trials than low spans. 
However, our findings, along with Long and Prat’s, clearly indicate that there are important interactions 
between WM capacity and task context in mediating Stroop interference. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Individuals of high- and low-WM capabilities, as indicated by scores on the OSPAN task, were tested in 
variations of the Stroop task. These variations differed in the proportion of congruent trials (e.g., RED presented 
in red) included in the design, with either low proportions (0%, 20%) or high proportions (75%, 80%). In all 
five experiments, high-WM-span participants demonstrated less interference than did low-span participants. 
These findings are consistent with the idea that WM capacity, as defined by complex span measures, is a valid 
predictor of attention control. 
 
However, the locus of the WM-span difference in Stroop interference—in latency or accuracy—varied with 
congruency conditions and the order of congruency conditions. In Experiments 1, 2, and 4, where a high-
congruency Stroop task was presented alone or as the first task, low spans demonstrated larger error 
interference effects than did high spans, with low spans more often naming the word when the color and word 
were in conflict. In contrast, tasks that presented 0% or 20% congruent trials in these experiments elicited 
consistently modest span differences in response-time interference. Low-congruency contexts generally allowed 
low spans to respond accurately, but they responded more slowly on incongruent trials than did high spans. 
Experiment 3A and 3B presented a 75% congruent task following a 0% task, and here low spans demonstrated 
significantly larger response-time interference than did high spans in both tasks. Low spans were not more 
likely to commit overt errors, but they were relatively slowed in accurately naming the color of incongruent 
words. Here, then, the 0% congruent task appeared to elicit a task set that transferred to the subsequent 75% 
task. Experiment 4 yielded different results using a 20% congruent task to precede an 80% congruent task. 
Here, the subsequent 80% task elicited greater error interference in low spans than in high spans, suggesting 
that tasks that include even a small proportion of congruent trials do not induce a task set that is strong enough 
to transfer to a subsequent high-congruency task. 
 
Our findings and a review of the literature suggest that Stroop interference is jointly determined by two 
mechanisms, both sensitive to individual differences in WM capacity. One is a response-competition 
mechanism predominating in contexts with few congruent trials. The time-consuming operation of this 
mechanism is reflected primarily in response times, and more specifically, in the regular shift of the latency 
distribution between incongruent and neutral trials. The other mechanism is a more transient failure of goal 
maintenance that predominates in contexts with many congruent trials. Failures of this mechanism are reflected 
primarily in error rates, but also potentially in the tail of the latency distribution. We argue that examining 
individual differences in WM capacity may thus inform theories and mechanisms of the Stroop task, 
specifically, in addition to addressing theories of attention and action control more generally. 
 
Notes: 
1 Strictly speaking, the Cohen model is not a dual-mechanism model, because goal maintenance determines the 
degree of response competition that is present to be resolved; that is, the extent to which maintenance is 
successful determines the extent to which competition will disrupt performance, and so maintenance and 
competition cannot be completely de-coupled (this is true also of the somewhat parallel mechanism of 
interference control in Jacoby’s Counter model; Jacoby et al., 1999; Trainham et al., 1997). Although current 
computational models may be characterized as having some distinction between goal maintenance and goal 
execution, insofar as even perfect maintenance or control may fail to completely block the influence of word 
information, competition is countered in these models through a single mechanism. 
 
2 Across many years of testing undergraduate participants in the OSPAN task at comprehensive state 
universities in different parts of the country, our laboratories and others have found that the typical quartile cut-
offs are 9 and 19, with some variation from year to year and from location to location (e.g., cut-offs of 8 and 
20). The ―distributions‖ discussed in the text refer to this modal distribution, as opposed to the specific 
distributions acquired from the particular participants tested in Experiment 1. 
 
3 As we noted in the introduction, research with patient groups, such as those with schizophrenia (e.g., Perlstein 
et al., 1998) and Alzheimer’s disease (Spieler et al., 1996), indicate exaggerated interference effects primarily in 
errors, as opposed to response times. 
 
4 Although we now have found evidence for WM-related differences in set switching between blocked 
conditions in both the antisaccade and Stroop tasks, other research suggests that WM capacity may be unrelated 
to trial-to-trial costs that are measured in currently popular task-switching paradigms (Miyake et al., 2000; 
Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, in press). 
 
5 Alert readers will note that our view predicts that a consistently deficient competition-resolution mechanism 
in low spans should produce span differences in response-time interference in all contexts, including those in 
which a 75% congruent task is performed first. We speculate that span differences in competition resolution are 
present in these contexts (indeed, low spans show numerically larger interference effects in response-times than 
do high spans), but these span differences are not statistically detectable. Because low spans lose a substantial 
number of incongruent trials to errors in these contexts, the deleted trials cannot contribute to their response-
time distributions, and so span differences in response time are masked. For a similar situation with Alzheimer’s 
patients, see Spieler et al. (1996). 
 
6 We did not examine response-time distributions in the present study for two reasons: (a) We were able to 
induce overt word-reading differences across span groups and congruency contexts, and so examination of any 
potentially more subtle goal-neglect effects in skew would be redundant; (b) Larger numbers of trials per 
participant are needed to appropriately analyze response-time distributions than we included in our design. 
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